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5.1  Introduction 
“Strategic trade”  is one of  those catchwords frequently  used in 
public debates and policy pronouncements which  through  repetition 
seems to have acquired an impression of clarity. The concept is, how- 
ever, ambiguous and I therefore propose to begin  my paper by dis- 
cussing alternative usages of the term. 
Thomas C. Schelling (1984) tells the following episode in his lovely 
book Choice and Consequences: “I was invited to talk about strategic 
aspects of social problems. I asked what that meant. I was told it meant 
whatever I meant. So, with  the uneasy feeling that it had just been 
used on me, I set out to characterize the ‘strategic approach.’ ”  As for 
myself, I have decided to follow a different strategy-here  is this word 
again! I set out to see what others meant by strategic trade. This is 
attempted in  section 5.2  which  looks at the evolution of  the concept 
in the context of U.S.-Western  European trade relations. The reader 
must be forewarned that he will not find there a precise definition of 
strategic trade. Nevertheless it is interesting to see how the emphases 
on different aspects of the term shifts over time. 
Section 5.3 of  this paper presents a model of strategic trade which 
lends itself to policy analysis. The question I ask is the following: Can 
protection of  an industry considered to be strategic be justified  when 
a possibility of embargo exists. It seems that a model of monopolistic 
competition is best suited to answer this question because it naturally 
Henryk Kierzkowski is professor of economics at the Graduate Institute of Interna- 
I  wish to  thank Professors K. Abbott, G. Hufbauer, and P.  Mathieu for helpful com- 
tional Studies in Geneva. 
ments and suggestions. 
135 136  Henryk Kierzkowski 
leads to concentration  of  production  in  the  hands of  one or a few 
producers. But for an embargo to be really painful there must be costs 
associated with replacing foreign supplies denied by it. The time nec- 
essary to build a new or reestablish an industry constitutes such a cost. 
I also argue in this paper that other policy measures can be taken to 
minimize costs of embargo. What is really necessary is that a country 
move from a position of strategic dependence to that of strategic in- 
terdependence.  It would, however, be costly, unwise, and almost im- 
possible to achieve a position of total strategic independence. 
5.2  Historical Background 
One might expect that  the Articles of the General  Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade would contain a definition of strategic trade. Alas, 
this term does not exist for the organization dealing with international 
trade. Only Article XXI can be construed to refer to strategic trade, 
albeit indirectly, as it states that the Articles of GATT need not apply 
in cases where essential security interests are involved. Unfortunately, 
the concept of “essential security interests” is even more ambiguous 
than “strategic trade.” It is up to individual contracting parties to the 
GATT to decide when security interests are, or are not, at stake. It is 
worth recalling that the countries invoking the security exception under 
GATT’s Article XXI were hardly ever, if at all, challenged in the past. 
The country  which,  in  the  aftermath  of  World  War  11,  has  been 
preoccupied with strategic trade and remains so is the United States. 
This concern is to some extent shared also by the Western European 
countries. It is revealing therefore to take a quick look at the history 
of U.S.-European  relations in this field. 
By the late 1940s the United States sought to regulate, through do- 
mestic legislation and international collaboration, exports of goods with 
military and strategic importance.’ The Export Control Act of  1949 
aimed at imposing limits on exports of military and strategic goods to 
countries with which the United States was not actually at war. Pre- 
viously, similar acts had only been enacted during periods of military 
confrontation, wars, or in the face of extraordinary emergency. 
In addition to domestic legislation limiting strategic trade, the United 
States attempted to forge international cooperation in this field. In 1950 
the United  States set up jointly  with the United  Kingdom, France, 
Italy, and the Benelux countries the so-called Coordinating Committee 
for East-West Trade (COCOM) with the aim of compiling and enforcing 
lists of strategic goods of which exports to communist countries were 
embargoed. 
COCOM continues to exist and at present consists of all the NATO 
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embargo list  is revised  and updated every two to three years. The 
embargoed goods fall  under  three different  categories: (1)  military 
weapons, (2) nuclear goods, and (3) strategic goods with military and 
civilian uses. The last group is of particular interest to the economist. 
Unfortunately, no detailed information is publicly available as to what 
constitutes a strategic good; it seems, however, that 80 percent are in 
the category of electronics. 
The enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act in 1951 
resulted in another list of embargoed goods. The “Battle Act,”  as the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act is known, called for denial of 
U.S. aid-military,  economic and financial-to  countries which  ex- 
ported embargoed goods. As long as Europe shared U.S concerns vis- 
a-vis communist countries and accepted U.S. political leadership, the 
Battle Act helped to develop a joint approach to the problem at hand. 
It would  seem that in  the late ’40s and the early  ’50s the United 
States had a very decisive influence in determining what constituted 
trade in strategic  goods and in enforcing restrictions on exports of those 
goods. Since then, however, time and changing conditions have weak- 
ened the strength of the U.S. position.  One can attribute this devel- 
opment to several factors. First of all, the United States ceased to be 
the dominant supplier of strategic goods, particularly when the term 
is used only with regard to military  hardware and equipment. It be- 
comes much more difficult to set and enforce a global embargo policy 
when the number of independent suppliers increases. Furthermore, the 
potential  threat of  “using  the stick”  in  the form of  the Battle Act 
became ineffective when Western Europe grew independent of  U.S. 
economic assistance, that is, roughly speaking, at the end of the Mar- 
shall Plan. 
It also has to be said that the maintenance of a joint U.S.-European 
policy towards exports of  strategic goods to third countries required 
not only a good deal of political cooperation and cohesion among re- 
spective governments but also a strong backing on the part of con- 
cerned industries. The European business community eventually came 
to see great commercial opportunities in East-West trade and has be- 
come determined to exploit them.3  The American business community, 
while not exactly following suit and openly advocating liberalization 
of trade restrictions with regard to strategic trade with the Soviet Union, 
certainly became aware of lost opportunities. When President Nixon 
made a dramatic shift in the U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic 
of  China, American  industry (and the general  public)  by and large 
favored liberalization of restrictions on strategic trade. 
In discussing the post-World  War I1 history of strategic trade one 
must not overlook atomic weapons, equipment, and materials.  Many 
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goods related to nuclear technology. In an attempt to check the spread 
of the nuclear threat, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was put into 
effect in  1968. The Nuclear Suppliers’ Guidelines which followed the 
treaty requires the exporting countries to obtain assurances from the 
importers of nuclear material and equipment that the transferred goods 
and processes be used only for legitimate purposes. Once again, while 
sharing the basic objectives of the Nuclear Nonproliferation  Treaty, 
conflicts and tensions have occasionally developed between the United 
States and Western Europe. Most recently, a nuclear reactor sale by 
West Germany to Brazil provoked strong objections from the U.S. 
To sum up, strategic trade during the first two decades after the end 
of World War I1 concerned mainly goods with direct and indirect mil- 
itary use.  The rules of the game were primarily defined by political 
considerations. Gradually, though, it emerged that the United States 
and Western Europe, in  spite of being close political allies, did not 
always share the same views on the matter. As one American expert 
put it: “Since World War 11, Canada, France, and Britain, and other 
important trading partners have vigorously opposed the extraterritorial 
reach  of  American  export restrictions  through  diplomatic  and  legal 
means. Even the extraterritorial aspects of American controls on ex- 
ports to the Soviet Union of  militarily useful goods and technology- 
controls accepted in principle and administered cooperatively by our 
allies-have  led to sustained irritation in E~rope”.~  As time went by 
and the political cohesion of the Western allies weakened, tensions and 
differences of opinion between the United States and Western Europe 
mounted with regard to strategic trade with third countries. The most 
recent incident has involved the Siberian pipeline. 
The main facts of the pipeline episode are still fresh in the memory 
of the general public, but are well worth repeating. From the beginning 
the Reagan administration saw the 3,700 mile pipeline from Siberia to 
Western Europe as exposing the receiving countries to excessive de- 
pendence on a Russian source of energy supply. Even though, accord- 
ing to various projections, the pipeline would never satisfy more than 
5 percent of Western Europe’s energy demand, the U.S. administration 
considered the willingness of  its allies to go ahead with the deal as 
imprudent at best. Additional concern was provoked by the fact that 
the Soviet Union stood to earn $10- 12 billion a year in hard currencies 
from gas exports. These earnings could be used to purchase Western 
goods and technology to increase Russian military strength. 
Following the imposition of martial law in Poland on  13 December 
1981, President Reagan ordered sanctions against  the Soviet  Union 
because of its “heavy  and direct responsibility for the repression in 
Poland.”  Trade sanctions included  severe limitations  on exports of 
equipment and engineering know-how related to oil and gas explora- 
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tion, exports and reexports of U.S. oil and gas equipment and associated 
technical data fell under very strict and specific licensing restrictions 
although more liberal and general licensing had formerly been allowed. 
Furthermore,  outstanding validated  licenses could  be  suspended  or 
revoked. 
It appears that the extraterritorial effects of the December 1981 reg- 
ulations brought the United States into open conflict with certain West- 
ern European countries. U.S. firms were ordered to cease exports of 
pipeline-related equipment and technology to Western European buyers 
if they knew that the material would be reexported to the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, the embargo of certain exports to the Soviet Union also 
applied to U.S. owned or controlled foreign firms. It was immaterial 
whether those firms made any use or not of U.S. materials or tech- 
nology in their exports to the Russians. 
While Western European countries were initially supportive of Pres- 
ident Reagan’s action, they were not prepared to follow the U.S. suit. 
Their support was limited to making public gestures of approval. When 
in  June  1982 President Reagan decided to harden his stance against 
trade with the Russians, Western Europe came out strongly against the 
American embargo. Both the British and the French governments moved 
to block restrictions imposed by President Reagan on U.S. owned or 
controlled firms operating in England and France. 
One of the major outside suppliers for the Siberian gas pipeline was 
the French subsidiary of  the American company Dresser Industries 
based in Dallas, Texas. Its contract with the Soviet Union, signed prior 
to the imposition  of  the restrictions,  called for delivery of  21 com- 
pressors worth $18-20  million. When the American parent company 
of Dresser France asked its subsidiary to obey the U.S.  government 
sanctions, the French Minister of Industry answered by instructing the 
company to ignore the embargo and proceed with the ~ontract.~ 
In response to the French government action, the U.S. Commerce 
Department decided to apply penalties by issuing a denial order. The 
order barred Dresser France from receiving any technology, services, 
and equipment from its parent or any other American firm. In the end, 
the U.S.  government was able to bring Dresser France to a halt by 
ordering its parent company in Texas to interrupt the flow of crucial 
data provided on a continuous basis through telephone and satellite 
channels. 
The pipeline episode, and especially  the Dresser case, shows the 
extraordinary vulnerability that modern technology imposes on trading 
partners. Consequently, the concept of strategic trade must be consid- 
erably widened for it goes far beyond the confines of military uses. 
The concept of strategic trade must also cover various types of  ser- 
vices. What seems interesting is that certain services such as design, 
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in the production process-there  are no substitutes for them. While it 
used to be that production of these services and production of respec- 
tive goods had to coincide geographically, modern technology allows 
these two stages to be increasingly separated. This separation could 
involve a high degree of  strategic dependence. Thus Dresser France 
could be run  on information  provided  by  its parent  company from 
Dallas or it could stop functioning if some vital services provided long- 
distance were withheld. 
In analyzing U.S.-Western  European conflicts over strategic trade, 
legal scholars tend to focus on the question of the extraterritorial ap- 
plication of American law as being the main source of the problem.  I 
think  the conflict is more fundamental. The basic reason for U.S.- 
Western European frictions stems from differences in the hierarchical 
importance attached to commercial policy in relation to foreign policy. 
In the view of American policy makers, foreign trade is part and parcel 
of foreign policy, and commercial policy should be subjugated to U.S. 
foreign political interests. Europeans, on the other hand, accept much 
less willingly the dominance of foreign policy over trade policy. 
Much more interdependence is seen in Europe in this respect, and 
occasionally foreign commercial interests seem to influence heavily, if 
not dictate, foreign policy. I hasten to add that this is particularly true 
of France and England, the two countries which still have global or at 
least regional strategies and whose political influence continues to count. 
Mrs. Thatcher frankly admits to be batting for England when she goes 
to Arab Gulf countries and triggers off  an avalanche of commercial 
contracts. It is clear even to a casual observer that the French attitude 
towards the Iran-Iraq war is primarily determined by economic interests. 
It would seem, therefore, that there are rather strict limits to which 
Western European countries are prepared to subjugate their commer- 
cial interests to their own foreign policy, and certainly they are much 
less willing to abdicate their trade policy to the requirements of U  .S. 
foreign policy. Today, there are also strong doubts about the efficacy 
of economic measures the United States proposes to take; the most 
recent example was provided by  U.S. proposals for a trade embargo 
against Libya and Nicaragua. Also, there is often a feeling of unfairness 
in  U.S.  demands for sacrifices from its European allies. During the 
pipeline episode Michel Jobert, the French Foreign Trade minister, put 
it very blatantly: “[Ilf  the United States wants to respect its oil em- 
bargo, let it start by not delivering eight million tons of grain.” 
It is my opinion that in spite of friendship and mutually shared long- 
term objectives, U.S.-Western  European confrontations over issues of 
strategic trade will continue in the future. These conflicts will tend to 
follow the same pattern:  A political or even a military confrontation 
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economic measures, among them the barring of certain types of trade. 
U.S.-USSR  tension will probably  continue to be a frequent starting 
point of these crises.6 There may well be other initial causes for em- 
bargoes. Libya, the Middle East, and Central America are geographic 
areas where a major crisis could  easily  erupt and force the United 
States to take decisive action. 
It can be almost taken for granted, for reasons indicated above, that 
Europe will behave in a much more restrained way than the United 
States, and it will certainly be less willing to use economic sanctions 
or join a U.S. initiated embargo. Confrontations with a third country 
will occasionally also lead to U.S.-Western  Europe conflict. To ensure 
maximum efficiency of embargo measures, the United States may be 
forced to restrict exports of certain goods, technology, or services to 
its allies as well, or at least to U.S. firms operating in Western Europe. 
It is even probable that a denial of certain types of technology  and 
services would be more likely and a more punishing action than the 
refusal of  goods. 
What kind of costs and advantages are associated with strategic trade 
and associated embargoes? What policies should the government fol- 
low? I turn to these two issues in the next section. 
5.3  Modeling Strategic Trade 
I now wish to develop a model of strategic trade which would in- 
corporate at least some parameters affecting U.  %-Western  European 
trade relations, either bilaterally or vis-8-vis third countries. Let me 
first  address the question of  the degree of  market  competition and 
strategic trade. Government policies towards this type of trade crucially 
depend on market structure. 
5.3.1  The Standard Model 
In the standard trade model, perfect competition is assumed to pre- 
vail in the markets for goods and services. Trading equilibrium usually 
involves nonspecialization when countries have similar factor endow- 
ments. In equilibrium, exportables and importables are produced by a 
large number of firms. Firms can expand their output at will. Further- 
more, reallocation of resources between sectors involves no adjustment 
costs. 
The model of international trade under perfect competition seems 
rather ill-suited to analyze the question at hand. For, in the absence of 
specialization, an interruption of U.S. exports to Europe for one po- 
litical reason or another could not produce disastrous effects. A lack 
of goods previously produced in the United States could be immediately 
replaced by their perfect substitutes produced in Europe. If  Western 142  Henryk Kierzkowski 
Europe decided to take no action of its own and continue to export to 
the United States, it would start running a trade account surplus. Of 
course, Europe could retaliate by banning its exports to the United 
States. 
If worst came to worst, an escalation of restrictions on exports could 
eliminate trade altogether. Both the United States and Western Europe 
would suffer welfare losses. In the limiting case one would move from 
free trade before embargo to autarchy after the imposition of embargo. 
Welfare losses would be exactly equal to the gains from free trade, and 
they would fall on both sides. What is important, however, is that the 
autarchy position could be reached immediately and at no extra cost. 
If, however, in addition to the United States other countries could 
supply Europe with products it needs, worst would not have to come 
to worst. Trade diversion would occur without Europe’s being pushed 
back into the position of  autarchy. To be sure, trade diversion would 
involve welfare losses as certain very efficient producers in the U.S 
would have to be replaced by less efficient producers elsewhere. Thus, 
the existence of alternative sources of supply could substantially reduce 
welfare losses inflicted on Western Europe by the United States. 
Enough has been said already to make clear that the standard trade 
model could be extended to the analysis of embargo, but it does not 
produce interesting results. The welfare cost of embargo can at most 
equal the gains associated with free trade. In a multicountry trading 
system, these losses must be even smaller. 
What are the policy implications of embargo analysis in the com- 
petitive set-up? In particular,  should Western Europe reduce  its de- 
pendence  on  trade  with  the  United  States  in  “sensitive”  areas  in 
anticipation of possible trade disruptions? The answer is an emphatic 
no. By  taking preventive (and protective) action Europe would deny 
itself the benefits of free trade without achieving anything in return. 
Our conclusion follows from the proposition  that free trade some of 
the time is better than autarchy all the time. However, this conclusion 
hinges on specific assumptions associated with the standard trade model. 
5.3.2  Imperfect Competition Models 
Let us now move to the opposite case, namely that of monopoly. 
Suppose that we deal with an industry in which the existence of in- 
creasing returns to scale leads to one producer’s taking over the whole 
market. We  can think of  the aircraft (or even better the satellite) in- 
dustry as being one such example. To  set the stage for the analysis I 
first wish to consider equilibrium in  the United States and Western 
Europe prior to trade. 
Western Europe’s airplane is called the Airbus; the American coun- 
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technical features-size,  carrying capacity, speed, fuel efficiency, and 
so on. Once produced they can operate exactly n years provided that 
proper maintenance service is applied. In the Ricardian vein, one may 
assume that labor is the only factor of production. The amount of labor 
required to produce one Airbus is a, while it takes a* units of labor to 
manufacture one Boeing. (From now on variables with asterisks will 
refer to the United States.) 
In addition to its use in the production of airplanes, labor needs to 
be expanded to service them. The respective input-requirement coef- 
ficients per unit of time are s  and s*,  respectively. The nature of  tech- 
nology is such that only the producer has the know-how for servicing 
its airplane. Thus when  final users buy  airplanes they  also commit 
themselves to buying a future stream of services. 
Suppose that, after a period of autarchy, trade in airplanes and as- 
sociated  services becomes possible between  the United  States and 
Western Europe. For the sake of  simplicity let us assume that both 
economies are stationary. Thus, the United States and Western Europe 
will build their respective airplane fleets (of either Airbuses or Boeings), 
and then they will try to maintain a constant number of airplanes in 
operation. 
Which company will build the entire stock of planes for the American 
and European users depends on their relative competitiveness. Note 
that the concept of relative competitiveness now embraces production 
of goods as well as services.’ The concept could also cover their cost 
of financing. With regard to the latter factor, if  Boeings and Airbuses 
were bought under credit conditions arranged by the producers or their 
governments, the sale of every airplane would carry an interest rate 
charge which would depend on the price of  the airplane and the re- 
spective interest rates, i and i*. 
I do not wish to go into the discussion of what will be the actual 
price of the airplane charged by the dominant producer when the new 
equilibrium emerges.  In  order to determine  who will  prevail  in  the 
market it is rather more important to ask what is the very minimum 
price that each producer could charge without losing money.8 
The cost of keeping an airplane in operation consists of  three ele- 
ments in this model: First, the depreciation cost which is the price of 
the airplane divided by the length of its useful life. The costs of pro- 
ducing an airplane are aw and a*w*. The lowest depreciation cost could 
thus be awln and a*w*ln. Second, in addition to production costs there 
are also servicing costs. These costs are sw and s*w*. Finally, there 
are also interest rate charges. (It is assumed, quite realistically, that 
the airplane producers also provide financing.) 
It is quite plausible that there exist economies of scale in servicing 
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that s‘ <  0, s*’<O, 8’50  and s*”>O. X  + X* denotes the total production 
of airplanes for the North American and the European markets in the 
steady-state equilibrium. In order to capture economies of scale, servic- 
ing is done in one location, say, Seattle, Washington; London, England; 
or Toulouse in the south of France. The assumption of the existence 
of economies of scale in servicing of airplanes, ships, or oil rigs contains 
a large dose of realism. 
We  are now in a position to ask which producer is likely to capture 
the combined Europe-North  American market. The winner will be the 
producer who will be able to offer a lower joint price of  the airplane 
(or rather depreciation), maintenance servicing, and cost of financing. 
These prices are given by equations (1) and (2) and can be best thought 
of as the minimum prices the two producers would charge for leasing 
a plane. 
(1)  P  = s(X + X*)w + aw/n + iaw. 
(2)  P*  = s*(X + X*)w* + a*w*/n + i*a*w*. 
Equations (1) and (2) clearly show that one’s comparative advantage 
may stem from one or more possible sources. With production and 
servicing technologies assumed identical, the country with the lower 
wage rate and the lower interest rate would capture the whole market. 
The latter element is very interesting because it is usually absent in 
trade models.  Lower interest  rates in the United  States, with other 
conditions being the same, would allow the Boeing producer to sweep 
the whole market regardless of its size. This case is illustrated in figure 
5.la. The PP curve shows the minimum cost curve for the European 
producer and the P*P*  curve represents the same thing for the U.S. 
producer. 
Interestingly enough, comparative advantage in  “financial packag- 
ing” can lead to domination of a market for goods and services. This 
advantage may be real or policy-induced. Figure 5.la shows how gov- 
ernments can give domestic firms a competitive advantage by providing 
them with interest-rate subsidies. What seems of particular importance 
is that the “break”  need not be big to lead to market dominance. 
Another interesting case of  competitive advantage  is  depicted  in 
figure 5.1  b.  Here the only difference between the Boeing and Airbus 
producers is that w*  > w,  and s*(X + X*) <  s(X + X*),  i.e., the U.S. 
wages are higher but the U.S. is more efficient in servicing at any level 
of output. The net result of this case is that when the market is relatively 
small, the low-wage country tends to dominate it; however, for a suf- 
ficiently large market, the country more efficient in producing services 
becomes the sole supplier. 
While the foregoing analysis suggests which producer may capture 
the market, it does not tell us what the equilibrium price will be. Surely, 145  Strategic Trade, Embargoes, and Imperfect Competition 
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Fig.  a  x+x*  O 
P* 
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Fig. 5.1  Minimum prices and market size 
that price will not be equal to P  or P*  but it will also contain some 
pure monopoly profit. How much higher the actual price will be above 
the minimum cost of  production is irrelevant for our analysis. It can 
be said, however, that the size of pure monopoly profit will depend on 
the PIP* ratio and the threat of  potential reentry. It will also depend 
on the commercial  policy pursued  by the importing country. When 
monopoly profits are present, some of them can be recaptured by the 
importing country through tariffs, taxes, and so on. The trading equi- 
librium price will be lower than the autarchy price. Consequently, the 
steady state output of airplanes for each market should be expected to 
be higher than before the opening to trade. Finally, the welfare level 
reached by each trading partner will be higher than under autarchy. 
I now turn to the consequences of an embargo. Suppose that Europe 
ends up being the importer of  airplanes and associated services. One 
would  expect that  Europe would  switch to Boeings  only gradually 
rather than all at once. In any case, the transition should not take more 
than n periods after trade is allowed. Assume that as of time to Europe’s 
entire fleet already consists of Boeings. Once it switches to Boeings, 
Europe could be dealt a very severe blow by being denied, not so much 
American  airplanes, but  rather maintenance services.  This is easily 
accomplished in  this model  because  servicing of Boeings owned by 
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The U.S. government could turn off the flow of maintenance services 
at will  without  worrying about the problem of  extraterritorial  appli- 
cation of the U.S. law. 
Suppose that indeed an embargo is imposed at time tk. The stock of 
Boeings held by  Western Europe becomes completely useless under 
the extreme assumption that Europe is unable to service American 
airplanes. This is the major cost of the embargo. If the cut-off of services 
was perceived permanent by Western Europe, a new fleet based on 
Airbuses would have to be built from ~cratch.~  This surely could not 
be accomplished instantaneously. Suppose that it would take T periods 
to get  the production  running  again and then  the new  steady-state 
position could be reached at once. The fact that adjustment takes time 
(it may involve other costs as well) means that from tk  to tk+T Europe 
would  be  deprived  of  using airplanes.  At  the  end of  the transition 
period, Europe would return back to the autarchy position. Note that 
a permanent  embargo would lead to autarchy even if  Europe could 
service the existing fleet of Boeings. Europe's servicing capability could 
only reduce the adjustment cost. 
In order to evaluate the welfare effects of the embargo, one needs 
to introduce Europe's welfare function. Suppose it is of the following 
form: U = U(x,y),  where x is the flow of consumer services provided 
by the existing stock of airplanes and y stands for consumption of all 
other goods (for simplicity's  sake "all  other goods"  are nondurable). 
The utility function often has a property that U(0,y) =  U(x,0) = 0, 
i.e., both goods are indispensable. In that case the utility level achieved 
by Europe at different points in time can be shown in figure 5.2. 
The level of  utility achieved between  to and tk  corresponds to the 
trading equilibrium and it can be called U(T).  The utility level enjoyed 
for t > rk+= represents the autarchy level and can be denoted U(A). 
By our previous argument, it must be true that U(A)  < U(T).  We  can 
now evaluate the present value of the stream of utility generated be- 
tween to 5  t 5  m.  The rate of time preference is assumed to be r. 
(3) 
If Western Europe never switched to Boeing its welfare would be 
fh 
9,  = JU(. . .)e-rtdr +  J  U(.  . .)e-"dr. 
f0  fh  + T 
(4) 
s 
T2 = J U(.  . .)e-'fdt. 
0 
Comparison of  equations (3) and (4) clearly  shows that reliance on 
American airplanes can increase or reduce Western Europe's welfare 
depending on whether 
;l(U(. . 
fn  .I - 
fh+T 
.))crtdt  5  J U(.  . . 
fh 
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Fig. 5.2  Welfare over time 
The above condition says that trade some of the time may not be supe- 
rior to autarchy all the time. The reason is that gains from trade achieved 
between to and tk  may not be big enough to compensate for subsequent 
welfare losses. It should be stressed that this result does not depend on the 
assumed utility function. If the utility function had the property that U(x,O) 
> 0 and U(0,y)  > 0, the utility level achieved between time tk and tk+7 
would be positive but necessarily smaller than U(A)  because some re- 
sources would have to  be engaged in rebuilding Europe's airfleet. 
Our analysis so far has not allowed for uncertainty of an embargo's 
being imposed, but this problem could easily be taken care of. One 
need only introduce the probability  of an embargo occurring over a 
time interval. Suppose that, if no embargo had occurred by time t,  the 
probability of this happening over the time interval  (r, t +  dt) is given 
by e-='.  Now the probability that an embargo will be imposed during 
the interval (0,~)  is Je-Z'dt.  Given this probability  one could refor- 
mulate our problem in terms of the expected present value of welfare. 
Recent literature on international trade under monopolistic compe- 
tition suggests that there are cases where restricted trade is superior 
m 
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to free trade. In the case of an embargo, one needs to know whether 
no trade is better than restricted trade. Equation (5)  holds the answer 
to the question. It is clearly possible to envisage a situation where a 
threat of embargo would cause a country to eliminate its dependence 
on foreign trade. Having constructed such a case we want to stress its 
special character and point out that other policy measures should be 
considered before a country retreats into autarchy. 
Strategic dependence of Western Europe on American airplanes or 
rather maintenance services provided by the Boeing producer could 
be eliminated altogether if  maintenance could be done by Europeans 
themselves. That may or may not be possible depending on a particular 
product and the market structure. This dependence could at least be 
reduced if  servicing was done by the Boeing producer, but in Europe 
rather than in Seattle, Washington. In this situation, the ability of the 
U.S. government to enforce an embargo could be substantially reduced. 
(Yet one should not forget the Dresser France case discussed earlier.) 
The last conclusion should be good news for those who are in favor of 
liberalization  of  trade  in  services and freedom of  establishment.  Of 
course, freedom of  setting up servicing stations in  Europe does not 
imply that the Boeing producer would want to do it. In fact, the assumed 
existence of economies of scale in  servicing pushes for a central lo- 
cation of servicing activities in any case. To  have a servicing network 
in  Western  Europe in  addition to the one in  North America would 
reduce benefits from scale economies. However, Western Europe could 
well insist on such a solution before switching to Boeing. Some effi- 
ciency could be foregone for greater security. 
In the model developed above, price bidding would result in a mo- 
nopolistic  market structure. The producer who is potentially  able to 
offer a lower price takes over the whole market. It is interesting to 
consider now the case of duopoly and see how our analysis and policy 
conclusions change. 
Our basic model can be readily modified so that it leads to a duopolis- 
tic market structure. It suffices to assume that when trade is allowed 
to take place, the two producers follow the Cournot strategy in deter- 
mining their supplies for each market. Such a model has been recently 
applied by Brander (1981), Brander and Krugman (1983), and others, 
so there is no need to dwell on details. It turns out that we can even 
assume constant marginal costs in  production of  airplanes and their 
servicing without affecting the results in a substantial way. The general 
line of  the argument goes as follows. 
Under the Cournot strategy, the Boeing producer sets the optimal 
levels of output for the American and Western European markets as- 
suming that the Airbus producer will keep his respective level of pro- 
duction  unchanged.  The Cournot  model  is  symmetrical,  hence  the 149  Strategic Trade, Embargoes, and Imperfect Competition 
European producer follows the same logic. Solving the model results 
in four reaction functions,  two for each producer. One pair of  such 
reaction functions is shown in figure 5.3 with regard to the European 
market. 
The vertical axis measures the steady state number of Boeings sold 
every period in the European market. The number of Airbuses sold in 
the same market is measured along the horizontal axis. 
The European reaction function, EE, is steeper than the American 
reaction function, AA. The fact that the two curves intersect means 
that both airplanes will be used in Europe. A similar solution holds for 
the U.S. market. In figure 5.3 the U.S. duopolist is shown to have a 
more than 50 percent share of the market. This would happen if either 
a* < a, or c* < c, or both inequalities happen to hold. 
In the duopoly model, simultaneous presence of the two producers 
in  the Western European market implies that an embargo on sales of 
Boeings or denial of  maintenance services cannot deal a devastating 
blow to Europe. While it is still true that Western Europe’s stock of 
Boeings can be rendered useless, there are European planes in oper- 
ation and, even more important, there is a continuing stream of new 
Number of Airbuses  0 
Fig. 5.3  Market equilibrium in duopoly 150  Henryk Kierzkowski 
production. No rebuilding of the European airplane industry would be 
required in this case. Of course, a U.S. embargo would produce welfare 
losses which would be mutual and at most equal in size to the gains 
from trade.  The fundamental difference between the two cases dis- 
cussed so far is that the former involved strategic dependence while 
the latter strategic interdependence. 
It can, of  course, happen that the two reaction functions in figure 
5.3 intersect  on the vertical axis. A suitably  large technological  su- 
periority of the U.S.  producer would make this result possible. In this 
situation, the market would not be shared and we would be back to 
monopoly. 
The analysis of the duopoly case shows that the weak case for policy 
intervention in anticipation of an embargo becomes even weaker when 
slightly more competition is allowed. To carry the analysis even further, 
let us turn to the case of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. With 
no barriers to entry, monopoly profits invite new producers to enter 
the airplane industry.  Thus the  pretrade  equilibrium  allows a large 
number of producers in the United States and Western Europe. Under 
trade, the equilibrium number of producers is certainly larger than the 
number of producers in either country under autarchy. With no tech- 
nological superiority, American and European producers coexist. Prof- 
its are zero and this condition is assured by free entry of European 
and American firms. 
It could happen, however, that U.S. producers would be more ef- 
ficient than European manufactures. In this case the trading equilibrium 
involves zero monopoly  profits  assured  by  the presence of  a  large 
number of firms, all of which are American. Western European strategic 
vulnerability reappears again. Now we are back to equation (5) which 
weights embargo costs against trade benefits. A need for policy inter- 
vention in anticipation of an embargo could be envisaged in this case, 
However, one could justified support of at most one European producer 
prior to the imposition of an embargo. No additional security could be 
achieved by having more than one European producer, but the cost of 
subsidizing them  would  increase.  Of  course if  an embargo were to 
occur, then but only then Western Europe should encourage new en- 
trants to dilute monopoly profits. 
5.4  Conclusion 
The purpose of  this paper  has  been  to look into the question  of 
strategic trade, embargoes, and monopolistic competition in the context 
of U.S.-Western  European trade relations. It should be stressed that 
the subject matter could be more naturally treated with reference to 
countries with fundamentally antagonistic policies and attitudes. How- 
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Western Europe may and indeed do arise. I have given a brief summary 
of these controversies in section 5.2. 
In modeling embargoes and raising related policy issues, it is im- 
portant to start with the right trade model. I argued that the traditional 
trade model based  on perfect competition is not very useful in  this 
respect. Countries with similar factor endowments do not develop stra- 
tegic dependence in this model in the sense of relying entirely on outside 
supply for an important good or service. Also, lack of adjustment costs 
means that the imposition of an embargo at most means denial of trade 
gains. This denial is a two-edged sword; both countries lose. 
By contrast with the traditional paradigm, monopolistic competition 
offers a setting where strategic dependence and assymetry of  losses 
arise naturally as a result of a tendency to limit the number of firms. 
This is sharply seen in the case of monopoly. I analyzed this case in 
some detail because it could result in the justification of domestic pro- 
tection. But even in the situation of monopoly, measures can be taken 
to reduce the degree of strategic dependence. The measure that might 
achieve this goal without hampering efficiency is liberalization of  for- 
eign investment and freedom of establishment. The basic argument is 
that a foreign monopoly operating within national frontiers of a country 
is less likely to deny goods and services to the host country (even if 
ordered by its own government to do so).  Internationalization of pro- 
duction and investment thus diminishes the threat of effective embargo 
and  reduces  the need  to take  protective  policy  measures  impeding 
efficient allocation of resources. 
It is important to stress that the issue of  strategic trade cannot be 
limited to trade in goods alone. Strategic dependence or interdepen- 
dence resulting from provision of services has become an increasingly 
important  characteristic  of  U.S.-Western  European  economic  rela- 
tions. Here again, more competition combined with standardization of 
services, and the separation of the provision of goods from the pro- 
vision of services could reduce the degree of  strategic dependence. 
Notes 
I. A very thorough review of U.S. attitudes and legislation in  this area is 
provided in Winter and Carlson (1979). 
2. It is interesting to note that there is no formal treaty establishing COCOM. 
Since COCOM is an informal organization, the EC countries participate in  it 
on an individual basis. 
3. Abbott (1981) points out that Europe and Japan have expressed in recent 
years a strong desire to liberalize COCOM lists. 
4. Quoted from Abbott (1984, 90-91). 
5. Actually Dresser Industries had initially asked Dresser France to comply 
with the request of the French government that the contract be honored. The 152  Henryk Kierzkowski 
U.S. parent company was caught in quite an impossible situation: complying 
with the French government’s request would expose it to American penalties, 
and obeying  its own government risked  French penalties.  In  an attempt to 
escape U.S. penalties for violating  sanctions, Dresser Industries filed suit in 
U.S. federal court. 
6. A direct political conflict of the United States with one or more Western 
European countries does not  seem likely at this stage. It has happened ex- 
tremely rarely in the past. Hufbauer and Schott (1985) in their comprehensive 
study  of  103 cases of  economic sanctions imposed  since 1914, include only 
two instances of  “head-on collisions’’ between  the U.S.  and Western  allies, 
One case pitted the Americans against the Dutch over the issue of recognition 
of Indonesia. In the second and better-known case, President Eisenhower took 
drastic measures against the U.K. and France after these two countries inter- 
vened in the Suez Canal region. 
7. The concept of relative competitiveness  based on  joint production of goods 
and services is developed in Djajic and Kierzkowski (1986) in a general equi- 
librium framework. The Djajic-Kierzkowski model  is based on perfect  com- 
petition and focuses on optimal choice of quality of durable goods. It can be 
argued that joint production of goods and services is even more likely to occur 
in a monopolistic environment. indeed producers may be tempted  to design 
products in  such a way  that they  would  also have  to supply services. The 
combined market over which the producer would have some monopoly power 
would thus be increased. 
8. In this model, as in Djajic and Kierzkowski (1986), the ultimate user of 
the durable good makes his selection of the desired model on  cost-minimizing 
grounds. 
9. Of course, an embargo need not be considered permanent. In fact, history 
does not know cases of permanent embargoes. However, our analysis carries 
through for embargoes of sufficiently long duration. 
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